In the current fight between the Executive and Parliament, Kenyans of goodwill should back the legislators. This is because we should always be wary of any attempt to reduce the political power and influence of individual legislators – which is the objective of most attacks on the National Government Constituency Development Fund (NG-CDF).
Let us be clear. Parliament is only as powerful as individual members’ ability to command support for reelection in constituencies. If members are politically weak, or rely on parties and their ethnic chiefs for reelection, Parliament becomes subordinate to extra-parliamentary political players. We must avoid that situation.
It is bad enough that, despite the 2010 Constitution’s empowerment of the legislature, our legislators act like enslaved people who after being free remain afraid of fully exercising their freedom. Our political culture is still one of legislative subservience to the executive. To understand the electoral origins of Parliament’s institutional powers, we must have a realistic understanding of what Kenyan voters expect of their representatives. Multiple studies show voters prioritise legislators’ constituency service – including “development” projects, bursaries, cash for funerals, among others – over their representation, oversight and legislating functions.
No legislator can win reelection on the basis of how many sittings of Parliament they attended, or how many oversight hearings they spoke in. What matters for voters is visible and attributable effort that voters see with their eyes. That means a lot of NG-CDF projects, harambee attendance and general personalised retail politics. Those who insist on the purism of separation of powers are being intentionally politically obtuse. Institutions reflect, among other things, histories of political culture. And whether we like it or not, our political culture is one whereby legislators are expected to provide constituency services. Importantly, that is the primary source of the political power of legislators. We can either work to change peoples’ expectations, or accept this fact and seek to make operations of NG-CDF efficient. In my considered opinion, we should do the latter.
Abolishing NG-CDF would amount to an unconditional surrender to the Executive. This is especially true under the current administration whose leadership has specialised in concentrating power within State House. After legislators lose their ability to demonstrate effort through development projects in their constituencies, they will be reduced to feckless praise singers. Grand corruption will explode to new levels. Executive impunity will be more entrenched.
Perhaps it is hard for some to imagine a more captured Parliament. By their own admission, legislators get instructions from State House on how to handle legislation. Yet it could get worse. Notice that currently there are legislators who, in part because of NG-CDF, still have the political autonomy to speak their minds. Many legislators are proud of their cultivation of personal support through their visible works. Take that away and the last of them will go mute. Executive capture of Parliament could get worse.
The writer is a professor at Georgetown University
