Political outfits go rogue when funding dries up

As insecurity linked to criminal gangs grips Nairobi and other urban centres, suspicions grow of political wheeler-dealers pulling strings behind the scenes.

This is not new in Kenya, especially during the fraught and toxic seasons the country now faces.

Political outfits in any country are often guided by certain ideologies, the foremost being the stoking of tensions by identifying social fissures, exploiting them, financing them, and directing them at specific segments of the population. But when such groups lose their driving force or funding, some resort to criminal activity instead.

 The best-known example is Mungiki, which emerged in the late 1980s in Laikipia County. Initially intended to protect Kikuyu peasant farmers from persistent attacks by neighbouring nomadic communities over land disputes, it morphed into a fierce political outfit in the late 1990s.

Some senior political leaders from both the then-ruling KANU party and the opposition were said to be financing it. The group was heavily used by the government to rally support for Uhuru Kenyatta in the 2002 elections as he vied for the presidency.

By the late 1990s and early 2000s, however, Mungiki was at the apex of criminality, with unsettling murders, extortion, and other dark acts driving its underworld activities in parts of Nairobi, Mt Kenya, and beyond—including Rongai in Kajiado and Nakuru. To join, one had to undergo rituals modelled on those of the Mau Mau uprising of the 1950s and 60s. Its reign of terror grew, and it was allegedly involved in the violence that rocked Kenya after the 2007 elections.

The group soon faced the wrath of the state after a spate of killings, particularly in Central Kenya.

Its members were hunted down and killed in a crackdown led by then-Internal Security Minister John Michuki, which began in October 2006 and lasted most of 2007. Nevertheless, remnants of the proscribed group were alleged to have participated in the 2007–2008 post-election violence that engulfed the country after the disputed polls.

In Kisii and Nyamira counties, the name Sungusungu is common. The vigilante group was created in Suneka in the early 2000s to combat insecurity in Bonchari Constituency, under the provincial administration with the support of local politicians. The government of the day commissioned it through the district commissioner, with firm instructions to fight criminals wreaking havoc.

A similar group was also formed in Kuria, within present-day Migori County, for the same purpose.

The name Sungusungu refers to a local army ant species and was adopted from the Sukuma and Nyamwezi people of Tanzania, who had earlier formed a vigilante group to combat cattle rustlers.

In Kenya, it spread through Kisii, where suspected criminals were killed—often through beheading—until crime statistics showed a decline. However, Sungusungu was banned in 2007 following an outcry over human rights abuses linked to the group.

The Chinkororo movement, with similar motives, was also linked to senior politicians from the region, including the late Finance Minister Simeon Nyachae. Formed to protect the Abagusii community against cattle rustling from neighbouring Kalenjin and Maasai communities, it soon evolved beyond vigilance. Chinkororo became available for hire by the highest bidder, engaging in political violence, and was implicated in post-election unrest following the 1992 and 1997 polls.

At the Coast, a major political outfit that unsettled the region was Kaya Bombo. The group was blamed for the 1997 Likoni clashes, in which people perceived to be “upcountry” were targeted over land disputes. It carried out raids, looted businesses, and murdered residents.

The slow government response was heavily criticised by locals, who accused the state of tacitly supporting the group. Kaya Bombo disrupted voter registration exercises, amid claims that politicians were fuelling its growth. It attacked churches and schools, spreading terror. By the end of the clashes, more than 100 people were dead and about 100,000 displaced.

Further afield, in Sudan, former president Omar al-Bashir co-opted the Janjaweed militia, originally a local Bagara Arab vigilante group that had clashed with the native Zaghawa people over pasture. As conflict in Darfur escalated due to Khartoum’s harsh policies against black African communities, al-Bashir armed the Janjaweed, elevating its leader Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo —better known as Hemedti — to national prominence and political power.

By the time the war in Darfur was over, 300,000 were dead, with Janjaweed blamed for majority of the killings and displacement.

With the war over, Al Bashir would later assimilate the militia into the national army, re-naming it as Rapid Support Force, a paramilitary of the Sudanese army.