Public demonstrations should not be a power grab through extralegal means
Opinion
By
Leonard Khafafa
| Mar 31, 2026
Youth protest against the Finance Bill in Mombasa on June 19, 2024. [Kelvin Karani, Standard]
Those calling for demonstrations have no public interest at heart.
The Finance Bills of 2024 and 2025 have proved a potent political flashpoint in Kenya. The former provoked nationwide protests, driven by the perception, widely held, if not always well-founded, of an expanding tax burden.
The latter has been received less as a corrective than as a continuation of the same strain. Even after the National Treasury moved to debunk more extravagant claims, elements within the political class seized upon the anniversary of the deadly June 2024 unrest as a convenient fulcrum around which to kindle public discontent, deepening the rift between state and citizen.
To a more dispassionate observer, the prevailing grievances over taxation, the cost of living and economic stewardship appear as much an instrument as an impetus. They furnish a vocabulary for what is, at root, a contest for political advantage.
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By several orthodox measures of accountability, the government can plausibly claim to have steadied the economy amid inhospitable global conditions. Yet such acknowledgements are grudging at best among its critics. In their stead, the language of “revolution” is gaining a tentative foothold, with June 25 once more being fashioned into a symbolic rallying point for the disaffected.
Sri Lanka and Bangladesh are often invoked as recent examples of states in which popular uprisings have precipitated regime change. Yet a more sober appraisal invites a harder question: Are their citizens materially better off than they were four years ago?
The available evidence suggests that both countries remain mired in precarious and incomplete transitions. In Sri Lanka, the acute shortages of food and fuel that once defined the crisis have largely abated. Nonetheless, the broader economic malaise endures. Recovery has been halting, the cost of living remains elevated and unemployment is on the rise. Moreover, rather than ushering in the systemic overhaul demanded by protesters, the upheaval appears to have facilitated a consolidation among entrenched elites, blunting the transformative ambitions of the movement.
Bangladesh’s trajectory since its 2024 uprising has been similarly unsettled. Political liberalisation has not translated into economic respite. Instead, the country has grappled with pronounced volatility and persistent security concerns. Reports from organisations such as The New Humanitarian and European Democracy Hub point to stubbornly high inflation and a contraction in food-aid distribution, underscoring the tenuous nature of the post-authoritarian settlement.
Many of the difficulties outlined above have, to a considerable extent, been mitigated under the Kenya Kwanza administration. Acute shortages of food and fuel, which were widespread in 2022, have eased markedly. Agricultural output has been bolstered through the provision of subsidised fertilizer, while a government-to-government fuel supply arrangement has helped stabilise both price and availability of petroleum products across the country.
In contrast to Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, Kenya benefits from a constitutionally entrenched system of political renewal, often cited among the more robust of its kind. National elections that are free, fair and competitive and held every five years, regularly ushering in new leadership across all tiers of representation.
The conclusion is inescapable: those urging public demonstrations, even amid a palpable risk of violence, are motivated less by civic concern than by the preservation of elite interests. Though global uncertainty, sharpened by the Middle East crisis, portends difficult times, it cannot justify attempts to consolidate power through irregular and extralegal means.
Mr Khafafa is a public policy analyst.