Somalia's next security challenge may come from the sky

In 2008, the US Army’s Asymmetric Warfare Group was preparing American soldiers for an emerging battlefield threat: The possibility that small, commercially available drones could be modified and used as weapons. During a training exercise called “In the Wind,” a team playing the role of an enemy modified commercial drones to deliver dummy munitions in simulated surprise attacks against American troops. The soldiers confronting this unfamiliar threat were initially caught off guard.

At the time, the exercise could have looked like preparation for a problem that did not yet exist. Years later, ISIS was adapting commercial drones for surveillance and attack in Iraq and Syria. What interests me is not that somebody predicted the future correctly. It is that they did not wait for the future to prove them right before preparing.

The purpose of thinking about the future is not to predict it perfectly. It is to avoid being completely surprised by it.

For much of modern warfare, aerial capability required aircraft, pilots, airfields and maintenance systems. For all practical purposes, the sky belonged to the state. Small drones have changed part of that equation. States remain enormously stronger, but armed groups can now acquire limited aerial capabilities without operating conventional aircraft.

Somalia, already fighting Al-Shabaab and Islamic State in Somalia (ISIS-Somalia), cannot regard these developments as distant. United Nations experts reported in 2024 that Al-Shabaab had used commercial drones for surveillance and was seeking weaponised capabilities. They also described five first-person-view drones intercepted alongside explosives in Galkayo. That discovery did not establish that the drones were weaponised or supplied by the Houthis.

A UN report on Yemen issued in October 2025 described reported cooperation between Al-Shabaab and the Houthis, including instruction in drone adaptation. More sophisticated capabilities could also arrive through external support rather than gradual local development, as conflicts in Yemen and Sudan illustrate. There is no conclusive public evidence that advanced systems have reached Al-Shabaab. But training reports and shifting geopolitical alliances make the possibility worth preparing for, not treating as established fact.

The danger is not confined to Al-Shabaab. On December 31, 2024, ISIS-Somalia attacked security forces near Dharjaale village in Puntland, northeastern Somalia. A UN report issued in 2025 said the assault involved suicide bombers followed by drones carrying explosive devices. It did not establish whether those drones hit their targets. Nevertheless, an aerial threat that Somalia is being asked to anticipate has already appeared in its conflicts.

The danger need not be a spectacular attack. Surveillance drones can reveal military positions or troop movements. Inexpensive aerial threats may force governments to spend far more on detection and protection. Armed groups need not equal a state’s military power to complicate its operations.

Technology is lowering barriers to capabilities once held overwhelmingly by states. Governments work through budgets, procurement and command structures, often for good reasons. Armed groups have constraints too, but may experiment faster. What happens when the stronger actor waits for evidence while the weaker actor experiments with possibility?

Somalia faces another risk. Disagreements over political authority and security responsibilities remain part of its federal system. Federal and regional authorities have legitimate duties to protect communities, yet surveillance or armed drones acquired for security could also become instruments of political confrontation. The concern applies equally to the federal government. Without oversight, tools intended to protect citizens could be used to monitor opponents or intimidate communities.

Sudan’s war is not a prediction of Somalia’s future. Its origins and military capabilities differ. But it demonstrates why aerial power deserves scrutiny where authority is contested. Somalia needs clear rules about who may operate military drones, under whose command, and what happens when that authority is abused.

Preparation is possible. In February 2025, personnel from Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania and the United States joined counter-drone training in Nanyuki, Kenya. The harder test comes afterwards: Do lessons reach other units, can federal and regional institutions share warnings, and do commanders know who is authorised to respond? Equipment alone cannot answer those questions.

Somalia’s East African Community membership also creates opportunities for cooperation on intelligence and aviation safety. That cooperation must protect legitimate civilian uses, including agriculture and humanitarian work. Treating every drone as a threat would impose restrictions without solving the security problem. Al-Shabaab’s attacks in Kenya demonstrate that insecurity does not stop at Somalia’s borders. Drone components can cross frontiers, while unfamiliar aerial activity may raise shared concerns for neighbouring states.

Security institutions need practical procedures for reporting unfamiliar aerial activity, sharing warnings, authorising responses and investigating misuse. These rules must work across federal and regional authorities and reach personnel in the field. Preparation should be routine, not a reaction to the next incident.

Nor should drones distract from Al-Shabaab’s financing, recruitment, territorial influence and exploitation of political divisions. Technology may change an armed group’s methods without changing the conditions that allow it to survive.

The soldiers surprised in 2008 had one advantage: they encountered the threat during an exercise, when there was still time to learn. Somalia has that history and evidence from its own conflicts. Uncertainty about who acquires new capabilities next should shape preparation, not postpone it.

Somalia does not need to predict the next attack to understand what is at stake. It needs to make sure that when the next technological challenge emerges, its institutions are not encountering it for the first time.

- The writer is a geopolitical analyst and development professional

abdidool@gmail.com